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4. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND DESCRIPTION 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction comes from certification of an Order as 
"final" pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) and 
Utah Code 78-2-2(3) (i) . 
Provo City filed suit (Record 1) against the State of 
Utah and Staker Paving because of damages suffered in 
connection with blockage of freeway culverts that backed up 
water and caused damage to Provo City. Discovery, pleadings 
and settlement negotiations were progressing until the State of 
Utah turned the file over to a private law firm representing 
the State's excess coverage carrier. That firm, on behalf of 
the State, filed a Summary Judgment Motion (Record 180). 
The motion was granted (Record 432) (attached as Addendum 
1) on the grounds that the State had immunity pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 63-30-3. 
The trial court certified the Order as "final" pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) (Record 415) (attached 
as Addendum 2). 
5. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented to the Court are whether the 
Governmental Immunity Act is applicable in the face of a 
constitutional question, whether Utah Code Section 63-30-3 
gives immunity to the State of Utah for obstructing natural 
drainageways, whether there are express waivers (Utah Code 
-1-
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63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10) and whether there are questions 
of fact that preclude summary judgment for the State of Utah 
that entitle Provo City to a jury trial. 
6. PERTINENT STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES AND RULES FOR DETERMINATION 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-2(4)(a) (Repl. 1986) -
Addendum 6 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 7 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 8 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-9 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 9 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10 (Repl. 1986) - Addendum 10 
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-11 (Repl. 1986 - Addendum 11 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(i) (Repl. 1987) -
Addendum 12 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 7 - Addendum 3 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 22 - Addendum 4 
United States Constitution, Amendment 5 - Addendum 5 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) 
(1953, 1988 ed.) - Addendum 13 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) 
(1953, 1988 ed.) - Addendum 14 
7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The State of Utah built the 1-15 
freeway in 1964. That freeway acts as a large dam between the 
mountains to the east and Utah Lake to the west by cutting 
across the natural surface drainage. The State diverted and 
concentrated the natural surface drainage into culverts under 
the freeway. In 1984, Provo City was constructing a golf 
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course east of and adjacent to the 1-15 freeway. At 
approximately the same time, the Utah Department of Transporta-
tion was extending the culverts to be able to place dikes along 
the freeway between the University offramp (in south Provo) and 
the Ironton offramp (north Springville). Prior to commencement 
of construction it was determined that the culverts were 
blocked with various levels of silt and material. 
During the process of extending the culverts, they were 
blocked off with large dams called coffer dams. After the 
coffer dams were supposed to have been removed, the water on 
the east side of the 1-15 freeway stayed at a higher level than 
normal and at a higher level than water on the west side of 
1-15 freeway for approximately three months past the usual 
historical high water peak. Provo City property was damaged 
because the water level on the east side of the freeway was 
higher than usual for a period longer than usual. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. Discovery was not yet 
complete, pleadings were not yet fully refined by amendment, 
narrowing of the issues in preparation for trial was ongoing, 
and settlement negotiations were still proceeding when the 
Summary Judgment Motion was granted in favor of the State of 
Utah. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. The trial court granted 
the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment (Record 180). 
The trial judge certified the Order as "final" pursuant to Utah 
-3-
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Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) (Record 432) and Provo City as 
well as other parties filed a timely appeal (Record 461). 
D. Relevant Facts with Citations to Record. 
1. The 1-15 freeway built by the State of Utah serves as 
a large dam across the natural drainage courses from the 
Mountains to the east toward Utah Lake to the west (Kemp 
deposition, page 108). 
2. The State of Utah failed to maintain the drainage by 
allowing the culverts under the freeway to become obstructed so 
that prior to the construction project, they were partially 
full of silt (Kemp deposition, page 112; Peterson deposition, 
pages 14, 16, 17 and 38). 
3. Although advised of the problem, the State of Utah 
refused to take any action to maintain the culverts and clear 
the obstruction prior to construction (Peterson deposition, 
pages 38-39; Kemp deposition, pages 113, 115, and 117; Kjelsrud 
deposition, pages 23-24). 
4. If the culverts had been properly maintained and 
open, the northernmost box culvert had the capacity to handle 
three times the peak flow generated from all sources on the 
east side of the 1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, pages 109 and 
111) . 
5. The northernmost box culvert was blocked March 19, 
1984 (Keyes deposition, page 12). The 60-inch pipe was blocked 
on March 30, 1984 (Keyes deposition, page 13). 
-4-
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6. A coffer dam is a temporary dam placed to prevent 
water from entering an area (Wilson deposition, pages 17 and 
35) built by pushing dirt out 8-9 feet high (Peterson 
deposition, page 12) wide enough for a trackhoe (Peterson 
deposition, page 35; Kjelsrud deposition, page 10). 
7. The coffer dams were built by Staker Paving (Peterson 
deposition, pages 10, 11, 40 and 120; Kjelsrud deposition, page 
10) . 
8. The coffer dams were removed by Staker Paving or 
their subcontractors (Peterson deposition, page 12). 
9. When it came time to remove the coffer dams, the 
operator of the backhoe could not see the underwater portion of 
the coffer dams (Peterson deposition, pages 21-22). 
10. It was difficult, if not impossible, to tell if all 
of the material had been removed (Peterson deposition, pages 
21-22). 
11. The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) project 
engineer felt that there was still some material left after 
removal attempts (Keyes deposition, page 43). 
12. The UDOT project engineer acknowledged that the 
coffer dams became saturated and unstable so the backhoe could 
not go far enough out to remove all of the material (Keyes 
deposition, pages 13-14). 
13. Provo tried for four months to get the Department of 
Transportation to respond to the problem of higher water on the 
-5-
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east side of 1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, pages 158-159). 
After Utah Lake receded, partial coffer dams were discovered 
still in place on the west side of the 1-15 freeway (Kemp 
deposition, page 188). 
14. The partial coffer dams were holding back water on 
the east side of 1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, pages 171-172). 
15. The spring runoff in 1984 started before the coffer 
dam construction was completed and the culverts were extended 
(Kemp deposition, page 189) because the contractor got behind 
schedule (Kemp deposition, page 189; Keyes deposition, pages 
39-40). 
16. The water on the Utah Lake side covered the top of 
the culverts (Kemp deposition, page 188; Keyes deposition, page 
11) . 
17. The UDOT project engineer was aware that the water 
was not flowing through at least one culvert (Keyes deposition, 
pages 22-23). 
18. The UDOT project manager did not investigate or 
bring this problem to anyone's attention (Keyes deposition, 
pages 22-23 ) . 
19. There was high water on the east side of the 1-15 
freeway from June until mid-September (Kemp deposition, pages 
92-96). 
20. The cause jot damage to Provo City was not high water 
from flooding but a backup of water caused by an obstruction in 
-6-
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the culverts under 1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, page 198) 
which created high water on the east side of the 1-15 freeway 
and caused damage to Provo City property (Kemp deposition, page 
198). 
21. The contractor was to have culvert extension work 
done before the spring runoff (Kemp deposition, page 189). 
22. 1984 was projected to be similar to 1983 as far as 
the level of Utah Lake was concerned (Kemp deposition, pages 
50, 67 and 93) . 
23. Staker Paving chose the method of construction of 
extending the culverts (Keyes deposition, page 7). The method 
chosen was the use of coffer dams to hold water back so the 
area could be pumped dry to do the necessary culvert extensions 
(Keyes deposition, pages 11-12). There were alternate methods 
of construction (Kemp deposition, pages 161-162). 
24. The construction project fell behind schedule (Kemp 
deposition, page 189; Keyes deposition, page 39-40; Kjelsrud 
deposition, page 19). 
25. The State of Utah knew the inherent danger created 
by blocking the culverts under the dam created by the 1-15 
freeway. This was evidenced by their concern not to block all 
the culverts at one time, to block the culverts only for a 
short duration and its concern about having the work completed 
before the normal runoff (Kemp deposition, pages 164, 189). 
26. The State of Utah engineered the construction job 
(Keyes deposition, page 5) and did the inspection of the work 
-7-
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on the construction project daily (Peterson deposition, page 
29-30; Kjelsrud deposition, page 13). 
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT f --, 
The State of Utah's conduct in trespass, nuisance and 
damaging property violates constitutionally protected rights 
which violations are not protected by governmental immunity. 
Even if such conduct were protected by governmental immunity, 
Utah Code Section 63-30-3, there is no provision for absolute 
immunity contained in the Governmental Immunity Act. The 
legislature has provided waivers for specific activities (Utah 
Code 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10) even where a government is 
engaged in a governmental function. The State of Utah, as a 
landowner, blocked a natural drainageway by constructing the 
1-15 freeway and owed a duty to Provo City that pre-existed 
both the 1984 construction project and the March 29, 1984 
amendment to Utah Code Section 63-30-3 which added management 
of flood water as a governmental function. Whether or not the 
. . . -8-
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activity that did damage to Provo City property was flood 
related or was a pre-existing condition is a question of fact 
that should be submitted to a jury. Because the construction 
of the 1-15 freeway preceded the 1-15 diking project and 
because of the duty owed to adjacent landowners by the State of 
Utah, Provo City is entitled to a trial on the merits. 
9. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS ACTION CAN BE MAINTAINED AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The right to sue a state in either the federal or state 
court is not derived from the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, but can only come from consent of the State. 
Gross v. Washington State Ferries, 367 P.2d 600 (Washington, 
1962). A State, as a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it 
consents to be sued. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 
1983). 
The activities, operations, and contracts of the state 
government and other public entities are protected from suit by 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Campbell v. Park, 389 P.2d 
464 (Utah, 1964) and only the legislature can waive sovereign 
immunity, Bailey Service and Supply Corporation v. State of 
Utah, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah, 1975). The Supreme Court of Utah has 
held that where there is a general preservation of governmental 
immunity any exception must be clearly stated within the 
-9-
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provisions of the statute. Epting v. State of Utah, 546 P.2d 
242, 244 (Utah, 1976) • 
Going back to the time when there were courts of law and 
courts of equity and coming to us through the common law, 
matters of equity are exceptions to governmental immunity. El 
Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah, 
1977) Bowles v. State of Utah, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah, 1982). 
It seems too plain to have to restate that the rights 
protected by the constitution cannot be compromised by the 
legislature without amending the constitution. 
The clear implication of these holdings together with the 
Governmental Immunity Act is that the legislature has affirma-
tively created the right to sue the state and the courts have 
defined and protected that right. 
POINT II 
TRESPASS, NUISANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM 
ARE NOT CUT OFF BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM. 
No person can be deprived of property without due process 
of law (Utah Constitution Article I Section 7) and private 
property cannot be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation (Utah Constitution Article I Section 22). Similar 
protections are provided in the Bill of Rights to the 
Constitution of the United States by the Fifth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has held that even a 
-10-
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"temporary" taking is compensable. First Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378 
(1987). 
The construction of the 1-15 freeway by the State of Utah 
altered the natural flow of surface waters and channeled them 
into culverts. The culverts were allowed to become plugged and 
in conjunction with the construction project the culverts were 
blocked by coffer dams. Although notified repeatedly of the 
problem, the State of Utah did not take action to eliminate the 
blockage. These actions by the State of Utah resulted in 
trespass, nuisance and a temporary taking of property which 
resulted in damage to Provo City. 
Because constitutional rights protecting property 
supersede legislative acts there is no governmental immunity 
for the constitutional claim and Provo City is entitled to a 
trial on the merits rather than dismissal by summary judgment. 
B. THE STATE OF UTAH IS LIABLE FOR TRESPASS AND NUISANCE 
WITHOUT REGARD TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
The first culvert was blocked by constructing a coffer 
dam on March 19, 1984 (Keyes deposition, page 12). That coffer 
dam was on the northernmost culvert that carried approximately 
80 percent of the water off of the area in which Provo was 
constructing the golf course and the culvert was sized to carry 
three times the peak flow from all sources on the east side of 
1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, pages 109, 111; Kemp affidavit, 
-11-
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Record No, 214 at 216). The 60-inch culvert was blocked next 
by construction of a coffer dam commencing March 30, 1984 
(Keyes deposition, page 13). 
The amendment to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act for 
the management of flood waters became effective March 29, 
1984. The forces by which the State of Utah caused damage to 
Provo City were set in motion prior to the time any immunity 
was granted for flooding by the amendments to Utah Code Section 
63-30-3. 
Provo was denied the opportunity to complete discovery 
when the Summary Judgment Motion of the State of Utah was 
granted by the lower court December 2, 1987 (Record 360). 
Based on information discovered, Provo intends to amend its 
complaint upon remand to include allegations of trespass and 
nuisance. 
The State of Utah as a landowner built the 1-15 freeway. 
That freeway interfered with the natural drainage from the 
mountains and now acts as a large dam. (Kemp deposition, page 
108.) The culverts under the 1-15 freeway were partially 
plugged with silt prior to the commencement of the construction 
project (Petersen deposition, page 38; Kemp deposition, page 
112). The silting was brought to the attention of the State 
but it decided not to clean the culverts (Peterson deposition, 
pages 38-39; Kemp deposition, pages 113, 115, 117). Provo 
tried for four months to get UDOT to respond to the problem of 
-12-
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the higher water on the east side of the 1-15 freeway (Kemp 
deposition, pages 158-159). If the culverts had been properly 
maintained and open the northernmost box culvert had the 
capacity to handle three times the peak flow generated from all 
sources on the east side of the 1-15 freeway. (Kemp 
deposition, pages 109 and 111). 
A landowner has the right to be free of water causing 
damage on his land as a result of that water not being able to 
follow the natural drainage course. Reeder v. Brigham City, 
413 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah, 1966). The State of Utah should be 
liable to Provo City since the State of Utah caused water to be 
diverted from its natural drainage course to Provo City's 
damage. . • 
In addition to the silting that existed prior to the 
commencement of construction, the State, through an independent 
contractor, placed coffer dams at each end of the culverts 
under 1-15 freeway which further blocked the natural drainage 
of the area east of the 1-15 freeway as discussed above. 
Interference with the normal flow of surface water across 
or on another's land may create liability under the general 
rules applicable to private nuisance if the invasion is 
intentional and unreasonable under rules of private nuisance. 
Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Company, 407 P.2d 573, 576 
(Utah, 1985). The Oregon Supreme Court held that without the 
consent of an adjoining property owner, a landowner has no 
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right to unreasonably interrupt or retard natural flow of water 
and no right to throw water back upon adjoining landowners. 
Wimmer v. Compton, 560 P.2d 626 (Oregon, 1977). 
The State of Utah knew of the inherent danger created by 
blocking the culverts under the dam created by the 1-15 
freeway. This was evidenced by its concern not to block all 
the culverts at the same time, to block them for only a short 
duration, and to complete the work before the normal runoff. 
(Kemp deposition, pages 164 and 189).
 ; 
It is a question of fact whether or not the 1-15 freeway 
contruction which acts as a dam, qualifies as a hazardous 
activity raising the doctrine of strict liability or whether it 
is a diversion of such long-standing that it has become a 
permanent feature such that the State cannot be found strictly 
liable (Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users 
Association, 576 P.2d 517, 523 (Arizona, 1978). The failure to 
maintain the culverts under the freeway aggravated by the 
installation of coffer dams which obstructed flows from the 
natural drainage area create the condition for the application 
of the doctrine of strict liability. Sanford v. University of 
Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah, 1971). 
The State has a duty to maintain the culverts under the 
1-15 freeway in a good operating condition to absorb storm 
waters. That duty includes keeping the culverts free of 
obstructions or conditions that would restrict the flows. 
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Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users Association, 576 
P.2d 517, 523 (Arizona, 1978). 
The coffer dams were built by Staker (Peterson 
deposition, pages 10 and 120). Hikiau, a subcontractor of 
Staker removed the coffer dams on the culverts Hikiau was 
extending and Gall-egos was helped by Staker in removing the 
coffer dams on the culverts they were extending (Peterson 
deposition, page 12). Staker removed the coffer dams with a 
large backhoe (Peterson deposition, page 14), but it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to tell if all of the material 
from the coffer dams had been removed (Peterson deposition, 
pages 21-22) because the water was so high (Peterson 
deposition, pages 20-21). 
The State of Utah engineered the construction (Keyes 
deposition, page 5) and did daily inspections of the work on 
the construction project (Peterson deposition, pages 29 and 30). 
Provo is entitled to a trial on the questions of 
trespass, nuisance and whether the State of Utah failed to 
exercise that degree of care necessary to protect adjoining 
land owned by Provo and thus was a proximate cause of the 
damage. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE SECTION 63-30-3 DOES NOT PROVIDE 
IMMUNITY TO THE STATE OF UTAH AND/OR 
ITS CONTRACTORS (STAKER PAVING). 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 63-30-3 as amended preserves immunity to the State and 
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subsequent Sections of the act waive sovereign immunity in 
certain specific actions, Rice v. Granite School District, 456 
P.2d 159 (Utah, 1969) . 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was adopted by the 
legislature in 1965 as Title 63 Chapter 30 of the Utah 
Government Code. Utah Code Section 63-30-3 is a reservation of 
immunity to governmental entities. Subsequent sections of the 
Utah Code Annotated (63-30-5, 63-30-6, 63-30-7, 63-30-8, 
63-30-9, 63-30-10 with exception, and 63-30-10.5) are clearly 
intended by the legislature to be waivers of that immunity. 
The language of Section 63-30-3 provides in part: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit from any injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function... 
The language stating "except as may be otherwise 
provided" refers to the specific waivers in subsequent 
sections. The legislature added language to Utah Code Section 
63-30-3 which became effective March 29, 1984 as follows: 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
The right of Provo City to maintain an action against the 
state can derive from the finding that the injury did not 
result from the exercise of a governmental function, or from a 
finding that even though the injury did result from a 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
governmental function, that governmental immunity has been 
expressly waived. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983). 
A. GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. 
This court redefined governmental function in the 
benchmark case of Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp, 605 P.2d 
1230, 1236-1237 (Utah, 1980) as follows: 
We therefore hold that the test for determining 
governmental immunity is whether the activity 
under consideration is of such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a governmental 
agency or that it is essential to the core of 
government. 
The Standiford court then held that the operation of a 
golf course was not essential to governing and therefore was 
not a governmental function. That decision was reached with 
full knowledge that the municipality (Salt Lake City) as well 
as other municipalities often do operate municipal golf 
courses. The holding was amplified when the court decided 
Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah, 1982) and found 
that collection and disposal of sewage, though often associated 
with the operations of municipalities, is not essential to the 
core of government activity. Citing the Thomas case, the Court 
pointed out in Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676 
P.2d 399 (Utah, 1984) that the claim requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act were not required or applicable for a 
negligence action against the District because the operation of 
the system was not a governmental function. 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The principle that the action or activity being 
considered to be a governmental function must be of such a 
unique nature that only government can perform it, was 
reaffirmed in Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 629 P.2d 
432, 434 (Utah, 1981). In Johnson this court reaffirmed the 
point that there is no immunity for negligence if government is 
not performing a governmental function. This result was 
reached by referring to the Standiford test above. The Court 
again reaffirmed its position in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 
627, 629 (Utah, 1983) . 
The legislature broadened the definition of governmental 
function, Utah Code Section 63-30-2(4)(a) effective in 1987. 
The facts and circumstances of this case took place before that 
date. Even if the new definition had been in place at the 
time, the special waivers discussed below would allow Provo 
City to maintain its lawsuit. 
Applying the foregoing to the facts and circumstances of 
this appeal demonstrates that the State of Utah was not 
performing a government function and is not immune to an action 
for negligence (Utah Code Section 63-30-10). It would make no 
sense to hold that the failure to maintain culverts under a 
freeway or the failure to remove or the negligent removal of 
coffer dams is essential to governing when it has been held 
that a public health activity like the disposal of sewage is 
not essential to governing and is not a governmental function. 
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To make such a holding would make a mockery of the definition 
and application of governmental function. The legislature has 
provided express waivers even where the activity is found to be 
a govermental function. 
The State of Utah built the 1-15 freeway. This freeway 
moves traffic through Utah County but it also serves as a large 
dam across the natural drainage courses from the mountains 
(Kemp deposition, page 108). The State placed culverts under 
the freeway to facilitate the drainage. The State failed to 
maintain the drainage by allowing the culverts under the 
freeway to become obstructed so that prior to the construction 
project they were partially full of silt (Kemp deposition, page 
112; Peterson deposition, page 38). Although advised of the 
problem, the State refused to take any action to maintain the 
culverts and clear the obstruction (Peterson deposition, pages 
30-39; Kemp deposition, pages 113, 115 and 117). 
Then, the State started the "dike project" in the early 
Spring of 1984. It proceeded to block off the culverts which 
provide the drainage from the mountains by constructing large 
coffer dams to hold back the water while extensions were made 
to existing culverts under the 1-15 freeway. The work got 
behind schedule (Kjelsrud deposition, page 19; Kemp deposition, 
page 189; Keyes deposition, pages 39-40). The rising water 
covered the top of the culverts and much of the coffer dams. 
When it came time to remove the coffer dams, the operator of 
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the backhoe could not see the underwater portion of the coffer 
dams (Peterson deposition, pages 21-22) and it was difficult, 
if not impossible, to tell if all of the material had been 
removed (Peterson deposition, pages 21-22). The UDOT project 
engineer was aware that the coffer dams were so saturated that 
the backhoe could not go out far enough to remove all of the 
material (Keyes deposition, pages 13-14), Four months later, 
after Utah Lake receded, partial coffer dams were discovered 
still in place (Kemp deposition, page 188) which were holding 
back water on the east side of 1-15 freeway (Kemp deposition, 
pages 171-172) . 
The decision to build a freeway would logically fall 
within the Standiford test as* would the decision to condemn 
land for its placement. However, at some point, to claim a 
high degree of uniqueness or core activity that can only be 
performed by government is untenable. It has been held in 
Illinois for example that pothole maintenance on the roads is 
not a governmental function. Lusietto v. Kingan, 246 M.E.2d 24 
(Illinois, 1969). One has to look no further than Brigham 
Young University in Provo as an example of roads built and 
maintained privately. The actual construction work on most 
freeways is done by private contractors. The actual 
construction work done on the 1-15 freeway dike project was 
done by private contractors. To say the project met the 
Standiford test as to uniqueness or core government activity 
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necessary for governing would torture reality. Although in 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah, 1975) there was a 
discussion in regard to whether or not an action was a 
discretionary function in a case involving the design of a 
highway project that caused flooding, this Court recognized 
that even though high level decisions and actions may be 
protected, lower level activity and the actual implementation 
are not. 
The actual language added to Utah Code Section 63-30-3 in 
March 29, 1984 reads: 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental entities 
and their officers and employees are immune from 
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
There is nothing in the language, in the legislative 
history or anywhere else that would indicate that the 
legislature intended to do anything other than add explanation 
as to what constitutes a governmental function. There is no 
provision in the statutory scheme for absolute immunity 
unmodified by waivers or exceptions. Utah Code Section 63-30-3 
is subject to the waivers the legislature has provided. 
B. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. 
It would be manifestly unfair, as well as poor public 
policy, to allow the State of Utah to avoid liability and 
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exposure which it would otherwise be subject to under the 
provisions expressly waiving immunity, by interpreting Utah 
Code Section 63-30-3 as an absolute immunity. The legislative 
scheme gives no such protection. This Court held that full 
compliance with the statute is necessary to maintain an action 
under the Governmental Immunity Act. Scarborough v. Granite 
School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah, 1975). Implicit in 
that holding, and in the supplanting of common law sovereign 
immunity through the legislatively enacted Governmental 
Immunity Act, is the requirement of strict adherence to the 
statutory scheme. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah, 
1983). This strict adherence cuts both ways. It is equally 
binding on those making claims on government as it is on 
government being bound. The scheme is clear. The State of 
Utah has reserved immunity to itself except as waived. 
The preamble words to Utah Code Section 63-30-3 "Except 
as may be otherwise provided" invite attention to those express 
waivers in the sections subsequent to Section 63-30-3. Words 
are to be read according to their context and approved usage of 
the language. Section 68-3-11 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. 
1986) . The language on immunity for the management of flood 
waters was adopted March 29, 1984. Because of the modifying 
preamble language to the section it could appropriately be read: 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by 
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governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental entities 
and their officers and employees are immune from 
suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
those activities, except as may otherwise be 
provided. 
Utah Code Section 63-30-3 reserves immunity to the State 
of Utah except as waived. Sections 63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 
63-30-10 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. 1986) are express waivers 
of the immunity reserved in Section 63-30-3. That the State of 
Utah anticipated specific waivers for the areas set out in Utah 
Code Sections 63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 63-30-10 is clear from the 
legislation itself as well as the discussion by this Court in 
Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 511 P.2d 1286, 1287-1288 
(Utah, 1973); Andrus v. State of Utah, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 
(Utah, 1975) and more recently in Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Utah, 1980). 
Utah Code Sections 63-30-8 and 63-30-9 expressly waive 
immunity for injury caused by dangerous or defective condition 
of any public highway or road or for dangerous or defective 
condition of any public structure, dam, reservoir or other 
public improvement. This court found that the legislature had 
inherently categorized maintenance of a public way as a 
government function by virtue of the fact that Utah Code 
Section 63-30-8 waived governmental immunity for that 
activity. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah, 
1985). To now hold that adding the flood language to Utah Code 
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63-30-3 created an absolute immunity rather than just 
clarifying what constitutes a governmental function would be 
stretching beyond what the legislature created and beyond what 
the logic in previous holdings has supported. -
Utah Code Section 63-30-10 acts as an express waiver of 
Section 63-30-3 with specified exceptions. Further, any 
immunity reserved to the state under Utah Code Section 63-30-10 
for performing a discretionary function, failing to make an 
inspection or making an inadequate inspection does not modify 
Utah Code Section 63-30-8 or Section 63-30-9, Sanford v. 
University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (Utah, 1971). 
The similarities between Sanford and this case before the 
Court are striking and should be dispositive. The Sanford case 
dealt with an intentional alteration of a natural drainage 
system which concentrated the flow and resulted in damage. All 
of those elements are present in this case. The jury 
instructions given by the Sanford trial court (page 743) could 
well be jury instructions for this case. 
The Sanford Court adopted the "reasonable use" doctrine 
(page 744) and in referring to the restatement of torts 
observed that of the three types of conduct that may result in 
liability for private nuisance, the one that occurs most often 
is: 
Intentional . . . in the sense that defendant 
has created or continued the condition causing the 
nuisance with full knowledge that the harm to the 
plaintiff's interests is substantially certain to 
follow. 
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The Court at page 745 then observed that nuisance arises 
out of the interests invaded or the damage or harm inflicted 
rather than from what the defendant has done. The Court then 
stated: 
Today liability for a nuisance may rest upon an 
intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interests, 
or a negligent one, or a conduct which is abnormal 
and out of place in its surroundings, and so falls 
fairly within the principle of strict liability. 
The Court concluded that Section 8 and 9 (Utah Code 
63-30-8 and Utah Code 63-30-9) waived immunity without 
reference to the type of conduct which caused the harm or 
invasion. After setting forth the Governmental Immunity Act's 
definition of injury (Utah Code Section 63-30-2[6]) (now 
63-30-2[5]) the Court stated: 
This broad definition of injury when construed 
in connection with the language of Section 9 
indicates a legislative intent to include within 
the waiver of immunity an action for private 
nuisance insofar as the action is predicated on a 
dangerous or defective condition of a public 
improvement that unreasonably interferes with the 
use and enjoyment of the claimantfs property. 
488 P.2d at 745. 
This holding in Sanford and the waiver of negligence in 
Utah Code Section 63-30-10 are sufficient to enable Provo City 
to go to trial on the merits rather than be subject to 
dismissal by summary judgment. The State of Utah built the 
freeway across the natural drainage way and allowed the 
culverts to become plugged prior to any construction. Then the 
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State allowed the culverts to be blocked by coffer dams during 
construction and either failed to remove them or negligently 
only partially removed them causing damage to Provo City up to 
three months after the peak high water. 
The waivers pertinent to Provo City's claim against the 
State of Utah are Utah Code Sections 63-30-8, 63-30-9 and 
63-30-10. If Section 63-30-3 is waived by a subsequent section 
or, if the work was not flood related, or if the work was not a 
governmental function, then Provo City is entitled, under the 
law, to a trial on the merits. 
C. THE STATE CANNOT AVOID LIABILITY BECAUSE OF WORK DONE 
BY AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. 
The State of Utah is seeking to evade responsibility and 
liability for the work of Staker Paving. Staker Paving is 
trying to slip into a position of immunity by claiming to be an 
employee of the State of Utah. Provo is caught in the middle. 
The case of Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 637 P.2d 547, (New 
Mexico, 1981) (reversed on appeal after remand due to error in 
jury instructions and sent back for new trial, 667 P.2d 972 
[New Mexico, 1983]) has some striking similarities to this 
case. It involved a question of surface water, flooding and an 
independent contractor. The Court there found the landowner 
has a nondelegable duty toward adjoining landowners with 
reference to surface waters. The landowner could not hide 
behind the independent contractor to avoid liability for 
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negligent design, location and construction of dams and 
culverts the landowner caused to be built upon his property and 
which altered the natural flow or volume of surface waters. 
The Court then went on to point out that once the landowner had 
artificially collected surface water at a greater volume or at 
a greater rate than normal, which caused injury to plaintiff, 
negligence was established and the burden shifted to defendant 
to prove their defenses. Budagher v. Amrep Corp., supra. 
POINT IV 
THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE 
DISPOSITION BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. THE DAMAGE TO PROVO CITY WAS NOT FLOOD RELATED. 
Artificially high water from normal runoff after flood 
danger has passed and after high water has peaked is not within 
the governmental immunity provided by Utah Code Section 
63-30-3. This matter predates the legislative redefinition of 
governmental immunity, and, even if the definition were in 
effect, specific waivers apply. 
The damage to Provo City was after the normal peak of 
Utah Lake and after the high spring runoff period. (See Kemp 
deposition, pages 66 and 67.) It is a question of fact whether 
damage to Provo City property which occurred up to three months 
after the peaking of Utah Lake is "flood" related and thus 
whether the immunity of Utah Code Section 63-30-3 applies. 
If 1984 had not been a high runoff year, but instead had 
been a normal or even a dry year, the damage to Provo City 
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property would have been the same because of culverts which 
were partially plugged prior to the commencement of construc-
tion and because of the coffer dams which were installed 
starting March 20, 1984 and were only partially removed due to 
the negligence of the contractor. This created high water on 
the east side of 1-15 freeway from June until mid-September 
(Kemp deposition, pages 172 and 174) three months after the 
annual traditional high runoff and Utah Lake peak. The cause 
of the damage was not high water from flooding but a backup 
caused by an obstruction in the culverts under the 1-15 
freeway. (Kemp deposition, page 198). The determination as to 
whether the damage to Provo City property is "flood related" is 
therefore a factual one, and disposition by summary judgment as 
done by the court below is a premature, unfair disposition of 
this matter. 
B. THE FAILURE TO REMOVE OR THE NEGLIGENT REMOVAL OF 
COFFER DAMS WHICH BACKED WATER UP ONTO PROVO CITY PROPERTY IS 
AM ACT OF NEGLIGENCE FOR WHICH NO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY EXISTS. 
The contractor for the State of Utah was to have the 
coffer dams constructed, the culverts extended and the coffer 
dams removed before the spring runoff in 1934 (Kemp deposition, 
page 189). This work was behind schedule and the coffer dams 
were not removed in a timely manner. The spring runoff 
commenced and the water on the Utah Lake (west) side of 1-15 
-28-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
freeway covered the top of the culverts (Kemp deposition, page 
188; Keyes deposition, page 11). 
The coffer dams were removed with a track backhoe that 
had a 20-25 foot reach (Peterson deposition, page 14) but the 
operator could not see the underwater portion of the coffer 
dams because of the Utah Lake level (Peterson deposition, pages 
21-22; Kemp deposition, page 188). The UDOT project engineer 
acknowledged that the coffer dams became saturated and unstable 
so the backhoe could not go out far enough to remove all of the 
material (Keyes deposition, pages 13-14). Even though he was 
aware there wasn't much flow through at least one of the 
culverts the UDOT project manager did not investigate or bring 
this problem to anyone's attention. (Keyes deposition, pages 
22-23.) When the lake level receded, the partial coffer dam 
was discovered (Kemp deposition, page 188) and was high enough 
to hold back water on the east side of the 1-15 freeway (Kemp 
deposition, pages 171-172). 
The Governmental Immunity Act should not be used to cloak 
negligence. Otherwise it would signal a return to the outdated 
and discarded concept that "the king can do no wrong." The 
trend of judicial interpretation has been to pierce 
governmental immunity and make government responsible for its 
acts just as citizens are. The Utah legislature has recognized 
this in Utah Code Section 63-30-10 which waives governmental 
immunity for negligence. This represents a balancing of the 
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concept that governmental activity needs to be protected so as 
to perpetuate government against the concept that the govern-
ment does not have immunity for some of its negligent acts or 
acts which have been termed proprietary (pre-Standiford). 
Building or removing earthen coffer dams is not an activity 
which only government can perform and is therefore not a 
governmental function. (See Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp, 
605 P.2d 1230, 1236-1237 [Utah, 1980].) Whether or not there 
is negligence is a question of fact that should be determined 
by a jury rather than by summary disposition under the guise of 
governmental immunity. 
C. THE WORK ON 1-15 FREEWAY WAS MOT FLOOD RELATED. 
1983 was a year with high moisture and floods for the 
State of Utah. These conditions required many unprecedented 
actions to be taken to deal with the unusual conditions. 1984 
was projected to be similar to 1983 as far as the level of Utah 
Lake was concerned (Kemp deposition, page 98). It is a 
question of fact whether or not the 1-15 Freeway diking project 
was for the purpose of fighting flood water or for the purpose 
of obtaining federal money to get dirt placed along the sides 
of the 1-15 freeway for an anticipated future raising of the 
freeway. 
The State of Utah attached numerous letters to the 
affidavit of Lonnie V. Gleave (Record 292-305) in its Reply 
Memorandum to Christensen & Griffith's Opposition to its Motion 
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for Summary Judgment (Record 332) indicating the need for 
diking and flood protection. All of these relate to the 1983 
flood year. This correspondence was prior to the expected 1983 
high water and flooding. The freeway survived the 1983 flood 
year and was not anticipated to be any more threatened in 
1984. (Kemp deposition, page 45) The information that the 
state may have done this freeway work for purposes other than 
the diking project Was obtained only recently. Discovery had 
not been undertaken when the State of Utah's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Provo City was filed. The affidavits of 
William Neff and Earl Kemp are attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference as Exhibit "Aff (Addendum 15) and 
Exhibit "B" (Addendum 16). Mr. Neff and Mr. Kemp received 
information from Department of Transportation officials of the 
State of Utah that the dikes were being built because of the 
availability of federal money and the future needs of the State 
of Utah for that dirt to raise the freeway. Whether the cause 
of action can be maintained against the government should not 
depend upon the adjectives used in the Complaint to describe 
it. Hurst v. Highway Department, 397 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1964). 
This court recently ruled that the property in question 
has to be in the public use for Utah Code 63-30-9 to be 
applicable. Loveland v. Orem City, 746 P.2d 763 (Utah, 1987). 
There can be no question that the 1-15 freeway is in the public 
use. 
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It is a question of fact whether or not the flooding did 
provide the basis for the request but was not the real purpose 
for the construction project. The fact that the State of Utah 
called the project flood related is not determinative. 
D. THE STATE AND/OR ITS CONTRACTOR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
ANY NEGLIGENCE FROM ITS CHOICE OF METHOD IN EXTENDING THE 
CULVERTS. 
As part of the diking project on the 1-15 freeway, the 
culverts were to be extended on either side of the freeway. 
The water level in Utah Lake was expected to go to elevation 
4495 which was the same elevation it had gone to in 1983. 
Staker Paving, as the contractor for the State of Utah, chose 
the method of construction in extending the culverts. (Keyes 
deposition, page 7.) The method chosen was the use of coffer 
dams to hold the water back so that the area could be pumped 
dry to do the necessary work for the extensions. (See Keyes 
deposition, pages 11-12.) There were alternate methods of 
construction. (Kemp deposition, pages 161-162.) 
Through getting behind on the construction schedule, 
(Kemp deposition, page 189; Keyes deposition, pages 39-40) and 
with water rising on the Utah Lake side it was difficult, if 
not impossible, to remove the earthen coffer dams completely. 
(Peterson deposition, pages 21-22; Keyes deposition, page 44). 
The UDOT project engineer felt there was still some dike left 
underwater after Hikiau's removal attempt (Keyes deposition, 
page 43). 
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A contractor is responsible for his own negligence 
arising out of his choice of a method of construction that 
caused the damage in the circumstances under which it was 
employed and it is a question of fact whether the choice of 
methods was negligent. 
POINT V 
PROVO IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL ON THE MERITS. 
The standard for summary judgment is that there must be 
no genuine issue of fact raised by the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions on file or affidavits filed by the moving party. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). The reviewing court uses 
the same standard as the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 
P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah, 1977). -The evidence is considered in 
the light most favorable to the losing party and the summary 
judgment will only be affirmed when there is no material issue 
of fact, or there is a genuine issue of fact that is contended 
by the opposition. Theromy v. Sego Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 
526, 528-29 (Utah, 1979). Under this standard even though the 
State of Utah disagrees with the facts on record, Provo City 
would be entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment and to 
a hearing on the merits as a matter of law. 
10. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Utah Code Section 63-30-3 does not provide the immunity 
found by the trial court in the Order of January 15, 1988. 
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There is conduct to v/hich governmental immunity does not 
apply. There are specific waivers to Utah Code Section 
63-30-3. There are questions of fact which prevent the 
application of Utah Code Section 63-30-3 until they are 
resolved. Granting the State of Utah's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was error. 
The relief sought by Provo City is for the State of 
Utah's Summary Judgment to be reversed and this matter remanded 
for a trial on the merits. 
I ~ S DATED this 1 ^  day of June, 1988. 
i ! 
' • ^ ^ \< \--
GARY L. GREGERSON 
(/Avvv^ -A" / ^ T > ? V ^ 
VERNON F. (RICK) ROMNEY 
/^ .Uu '^f o. LL^,\i 
ROBERT D. WEST 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Provo City Corporation 
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11. ADDENDUM 
Description 
Order Granding Defendant State of Utah's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, dated January 15, 1988 
Certification of Order Granting State of Utah's 
Summary Judgment Motion as a Final Appealable 
Order, dated February 8, 1988 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 7 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 22 
United States Constitution, Amendment 5 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-2(4)(a) 
(Repl. 1986) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8 (Repl. 1986) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-9 (Repl. 1986) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10 (Repl. 1986) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-11 (Repl. 1986) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(Repl. 1987) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) 
(1953, 1988 ed.) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 
(1953, 1988 ed.) 
Affidavit of William Howard Neff, dated May 13, 
1988 
Affidavit of Earl S. Kemp, dated April 30, 1988 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CARMAN E. KIPP 
ROBERT H. REES 
KIPP AND CHRIST!/^, P.O. 
ATTORNEYS FOR O t 3. t 6 
CITY CENTRE I , #330 
175 EAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 "J 11 f • 2 3 ! 4 
I 8 0 I I 5 2 1 - 3 7 7 3 
F I L E D 
s f w n i i juiji* i-\ ['ii.-T#.'»»T ?.u\y~\ 
Cr uv.- i .•*,*» ; T , . : i . :: u :.•.•' 
ISE3 JAII 'IS H 3 UW 
\.; M [ i « ' M r .; , • ~. u
 :" j ; J; I* 
JULiulA. DISTRICT CuUHI OF UTAH COUNTY, 
SI • : • AH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah and Chr-i stetisc • 
& uriiinii uunoujuvjCioii 
Company, 
PL a J nl.i irTs
 f 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its Department of 
Transportation and Staker 
Paving and Construction 
Company, 
Defendants• 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civj 1 No, 696(3 8 
0t } September 22, 1987, defendant State of Utah filed a 
motion for summary judgmei it again:.t y \ H r 3 : i t! i c :i .r com-
plaint and against defendant Staker Paving and Construction 
Company oi: i its cross~c.l a:i m. Or -.t Octet <-* >> ' ' 8 " , 
d e f e n d a i :i t S ; ; '> . *. :i i i g a n d C o 
f o r s u m m a r y i \ i d p m e n t a g a I n s t plait * 
m^T j. -MI 
i . 'i i . 
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Corporation responded to defendant State of Utah's motion on 
October 16, 1987, and Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construc-
tion Company responded on November 2, 1987. Defendant State of 
Utah filed, on October 27, 1987, a reply memorandum addressing 
plaintiff Provo City's memorandum and an additional reply memo-
randum filed on November 18, 1987, addressing plaintiff Chris-
tensen & Griffith Construction Company's memorandum. Having 
read all five memoranda, and having researched the applicable 
law, and for the reasons set forth in the court's two memorandum 
decisions dated December 2, 1987 and January 4, 1988, the court 
being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing 
hereby orders, adjudges, and decrees as follows: 
1. Under §63-30-3, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), defen-
dant State of Utah is entitled to immunity from the claims as-
serted against it in this case. 
2. Defendant State of Utah's motion for summary judg-
ment is hereby granted in total, and plaintiffs' complaint is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, and the 
cross-claim of Staker Paving and Construction Company is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
3. Because there remains a question of fact as to 
whether or not defendant Staker Paving and Construction Company 
-2-
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A N O C H R I S T I A N . P C 
T T O R N E V S AT L A W 
"v c t M T n e i , I 3 C O 
5 EAST * 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LA«r. Cu r , 
U f A ^ O ^ l l t . ? ^ ! ^ 
acted cn.lv as directed by the State of Utah, defendant otaker 
Paving - : : •. > - , •J'IMM inn Company's motion for summary judgment is 
hereby "lev. i ed . 
.TED thisx3 day of January, 1988. 
M XHK COURT: 
S~\ 
lA^-y //6£<~66c*~i 
/ 
,j rr&s FOUHflTKDISTRlCT JUDGE 
Approved a s t o forro.: 
./ 
^^-,.^v>6 '4M f'3 /??£ 
"BRUCE RICHARDS, Attorney 
for Christensen & Griffith 
Co n s t r u c t i o n Com p any 
\ 
\ 
VJG'I^ L. WJ C ^ y [ r V > _ _ 
GARY GR^GERSON / ^ A t t o r n e y 
f o r Provo Ci^yJ Corpora t. ion 
u >H /^fr 
tOBERT HENDERSON, Attorney 
for Staker Paving and 
Construction Company 
• 3 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this /<Jy _ day of January, 
1988, true and correct copies of the foregoing Order Granting 
Defendant State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment, to the 
following: 
Gallegos Construction Company 
P.O. Box 145*17 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547 
Kevin P. McBride 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant Hikiau Construction 
Sixth Floor - Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MO CHRISTIAN. PC. 
OPN/CYS AT LAW 
CENTRE I , I 3 0 0 
: AST * o o S O U T H 
kLT LAKE CITY, 
AM e^lil-231.4 
''lvic/Li-jc.J C iiiCA 
_H-
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P'LEC 
flBuaiH JUDICIAL WSTrXT COUFf 
cf uTAhC:rv'v.5Ti;i r.r u'^i 
'-B88FEB II AH "I "1 A, b 
WILLIAM r.HU«S»j/CLIRK 
. - D L P U T ^ 
GARY L , GREGERSON ' *: ? ? •! * 
Attorney for Pla;::.:* ?: 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
(801) 379-614 9 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Of UTAH COUNTY 
STA TE OF UT \E 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, • ) 
a municipal corporation ) 
of the State cf Utah and ) 
CHRISTENSEN & GRIFFITH ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY., .. ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. . ) 
STATE OF UTAH, by and ) 
through its Department ) 
of Transoortaion, and ) 
STARER PAVING AND ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, . ) 
• •• - Defendants. • •) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Third-party ) 
Plaintiff,
 ; ) 
v s . ) 
GA1LEGOS CONSTRUCTION ) 
COMPANY AND HIKIAU ) 
CONSTRUCTTON COM-**— , ) 
T.nirc-party ) 
Defendants. ) 
Civil No. 69608 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
CERTIFICATION OF ORDER 
GRANTING STATE OF UTAH'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AS 
A FINAL.APPEALABLE ORDER 
Pursuant to Pule E ) the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, t.ie Ordpr cater a r.r. .*~-. a-.*- Januarv "c 9rM 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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granting the State of Utah's SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION and 
dismissing State of Utah as a party defendant in the 
above-captioned matter is hereby certified as a final 
appealable order as provided for in Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure against defendant State of Utah only. 
There is no just reason for delay of the appeal notwithstanding 
the existence of claims remaining against defendant Staker 
Paving. -
DATED this g ^ ^ d a y of ^Tj^ , 1988. 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Certification of Order 
Granting State of Utahfs Summary Judgment Motion as a Final 
Appealable Order to Gallegos Construction Company, P.O. Box 
14547, Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547; to Carmen K. Kipp, 175 
East 400 South, #330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; to Robert H. 
Henderson, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-4500; to 
Bruce L. Richards, P.O. Box 25786, Salt Lake City,. Utah 
84126-0786 and to Kevin P. McBride, Sixth Floor Boston 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, 
this £t,JU day otjf),^^*
 r 1988 . 
~' (T cr 
0r*Aj rv>t~ 
GARY L.\§REGERS9^, Attorney 
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Section [Due process of law.] 
VT
~ person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 18% 
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Section 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation. 18% 
ADDENDUM 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AMENDMENT 5 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due 
process of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compellec .. .... criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor h dennved of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
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63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) "Employee" means any officer, employee, or servant of a govern-
mental entity, whether or not compensated, including student teachers 
certificated in accordance with § 53-2-15, educational aides, students en-
gaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of an 
approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program, volunteers, and tutors. 
^ (3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
Kb) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, 
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. tion as set out in the bound volume and renum-
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; bered the subsections accordingly, added 
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2. present Subsection (4), and made minor 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- changes in phraseology and punctuation, 
ment alphabetized the definitions of this sec-
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63-30-3, Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
Historv: L. 1905, eh. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, 
$ 2: 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 93. * 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment added "and from an approved medical * * 
* or private facilities" to the end of the first 
paragraph. 
The 1984 amendment, effective March 29, 
1984, substituted "chapter" for "act"; and 
added the second paragraph. 
The 1985 amendment inserted "and other 
natural disasters" in the second paragraph. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Construction and application. 
Equitable claims. 
Extent of immunity 
Failure or omission to act. 
Financial institution supervision. 
Golf courses. 
Health care facilities. 
Hospitals. 
Misrepresentation by city. 
Personal liability. 
Proprietary or governmental function 
Recreational opportunities provided by city 
Right to maintain action 
Sewer system backups. 
Street repair and construction. 
Subdivision plan approval. 
Test for determining governmental immunity. 
Water system. 
Constitutionality. 
It is within power of legislature to impose 
such conditions upon right to sue cities and 
towns, which are merely arms of state govern-
ment, as in its judgment may seem wise and 
proper Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 
191 P. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5 (1920). 
Construction and application. 
This section indicates an intention that the 
act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign im-
munity and to waive it only as clearly ex-
pressed therein. Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm., 
30 Utah 2d 4. 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Epting v. 
State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). 
Equitable claims. 
Governmental immunity is not a defense to 
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. De-
partment of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 
1982). 
Extent of immunity 
Classification of operation of governmental 
entity as "governmental function" does not sig-
nal unconditional immunity und6r this section 
since the grant of immunity is expressly sub-
jected to operation of other sections of this act. 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980) 
Failure or omission to act. 
This section provides immunity from suit for 
injuries resulting from both acts of commission 
and omission involving the exercise of a gov-
ernmental function. Madsert v Borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Financial institution supervision. 
State's supervision of financial institutions 
is of such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency and con-
stitutes the exercise of a governmental func-
tion. Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 
1983). 
Golf courses. 
Operation of a public golf course is not essen-
tial to governing and is therefore not a govern-
mental operation with result that city is not 
immune from tort liability related to its opera-
tion of golf course. Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
Health care facilities. 
While 1978 amendment was not expressly 
made retroactive, the supreme court was disin-
clined, as a matter of judicial policy, to disre-
gard the obvious manifestation of legislative 
intent reflected in the amendment; for that 
reason, the court held, in a case which arose 
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prior to the amendment, that operation of a 
governmentally owned health care facility 
such as a university medical center was a "gov-
ernmental function" as contemplated by the 
statute prior to amendment. Frank v. State. 
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980». 
Hospitals. 
The state's operation of a hospital at a prison 
facility for treatment of prisoners is a govern-
mental function. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1978). 
The function of a municipality in the opera-
tion of a city hospital is proprietary and not 
within the coverage of this act. Greenhaigh v. 
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). 
Misrepresentation by city. 
City is immune to tort action for deceit and 
misrepresentation in its advertisement for con-
struction bids which failed to disclose to bid-
ders that a competitive advantage had been 
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake 
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). 
Personal liability. 
The Governmental Immunity Act has no ap-
plication to individuals: however, under com-
mon-law principles, a governmental agent per-
forming a discretionary function is immune 
from suit for injury arising therefrom, but an 
employee acting in a ministerial capacity is not 
so protected: psychologist working with univer-
sity medical center on contractual basis and 
alleged to have been negligent in his treatment 
of suicidal patient was performing ministerial 
rather than discretionary acts, and thus was 
not afforded immunity from suit. Frank v. 
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Propr ie tary or governmental function. 
Four factors to be considered in determining 
whether the operation of a hospital is a propri-
etary or a governmental function are: (1) 
whether the activity is something which is 
done for the general public good: (2) whether it 
is generally regarded as a public responsibil-
ity: (3) whether there is any special pecuniary 
benefit to the city; and (4) whether it is in com-
petition with free enterprise. Greenhaigh v. 
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). 
Recreational opportunities provided by 
city. 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a 
negligence action against a city for injuries 
sustained by a child when child's sled collided 
with a post on a city owned golf course that 
was open to the public for sledding in the win-
ter months. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981). 
Right to maintain action. 
The right to maintain an action against the 
state or its political subdivisions can result 
from a finding that the injury did not result 
Water system. 
Where city operated water system as a com-
mercial venture in a proprietary capacity, it 
was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by 
COLLATERAL 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defin-
ing Governmental Function Under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 Journal of 
Contemporary Law 193 (1983). 
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for per-
sonal injury or death under mob violence or 
anti-lynching statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142. 
from the exercise of a governmental function, 
or from a finding that even though the injury 
resulted from the exercise of a governmental 
function, the government's immunity has been 
expresslv waived. Madsen v. Borthick. 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Sewer system backups . 
Governmental immunity was not a bar to an 
action by property owner against city for dam-
age sustained when water backed into his 
home due to city's alleged negligence in main-
taining the sewer system. Thomas v. Clearfield 
City. 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
An action for negligence against a sanitary 
district is not subject to the one-year limita-
tions period for actions against the govern-
ment, since operation of a sewer system is a 
nongovernmental function, and thus not pro-
tected by governmental immunity. Dalton v. 
Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1984). 
Street repair and construction. 
Duty of city to repair or construct streets 
within its corporate limits is a governmental 
one, and in absence of statute no liability de-
volves on municipality- for defective condition 
of its streets. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 
Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (decided under 
former law). 
Subdivision plan approval. 
City was immune from a damage suit based 
on its refusal to approve a subdivision plan, 
since its actions were deemed to be a "govern-
mental function." Seal v. Mapleton Citv, 598 
P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity. 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity is whether the activity under consider-
ation is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency 
or that it is essential to the core of governmen-
tal activity; this new standard broadens gov-
ernmental liability. However, the position is 
consistent with the plain legislative intent of 
this chapter to expand governmental liability. 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980). 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity is whether the activity under consider-
ation is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency, 
referring not to what government may do but 
to what government alone must do, or that it is 
essential to the core of governmental activity, 
referring to those activities not unique in 
themselves but essential to the performance of 
those activities that are uniquely governmen-
tal. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 
432 (Utah 1981). 
plaintiff when she stepped on loose water 
meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiff's 
property or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City, 
15 Utah 2d 287. 391 P.2d 430 '1964). 
REFERENCES 
Liability of municipality for property dam-
age under mob violence statutes. 26 A.L.R.3d 
1198. 
Modern status of rule excusing governmen-
tal unit from tort liability on theory that only 
general, not particular, duty was owed under 
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194. 
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63-30-8. Waivei of immunity for Injury c;HJSe<* . *;- enM V<• -
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit o( all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 133, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Construction. 
Contributory negligence. 
Dangerous objects. 
Discretionary function. 
Ice and snow on sidewalk. * 
Manholes. 
Negligent construction. 
New duties not created. 
Nondelegable duty. 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about 
January 15. 1902. while walking on the side-
walk along First West street between Seventh 
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence 
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be 
on said sidewalk." not having misled the city, 
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake 
City. 28 Utah 248. 78 P. 479 (1904). 
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his au-
tomobile on city streets, and presented a claim 
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he 
cannot claim and recover additional damages 
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and 
general impairment," since such claim was not 
included in original claim, and could not be 
said to be proximate consequence of injuries 
therein included. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 
Utah 306. 134 P. 1167 (1913). 
In suit for personal injuries sustained by fall-
ing on sidewalk of defendant city, plaintiff 
could not recover for permanent injuries in ex-
cess of amount claimed in notice to city on 
ground that injuries were more serious than at 
first supposed, where she alleged no excuse 
why she could not initially state all conse-
(jiii'nci'M of injurifH descrilnMl in complaint. Ri*r-
gur v. Salt Lake City,.% Utah, 10.'! I'M P. 233, 
13 A.L.R. 5 (1920). 
Construction. 
A city is required to exercise reasonable care 
to keep its streets in safe condition and may be 
held liable for injuries proximately resulting 
from failure to do so and. in an action against 
city for injuries, the failure of a city to warn of 
or protect a row of dirt left in the street during 
the installation of a curb and gutter justified 
finding that city was negligent. Nyman v. Ce-
dar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P 2d 1.114 (1961) 
Contributory negligence. 
Ordinarily, a pedestrian with prior knowl-
edge of a sidewalk defect and an unobstructed 
daylight view who steps into a visible defect is 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
Eisner v. Salt Lake Citv, 120 Utah 675, 238 
P.2d 416 (1951). 
In order that a temporary forgetfulness may 
be excused, the cause diverting a pedestrian's 
attention from a known danger in a sidewalk 
must be unexpected and substantial. Other-
wise, the forgetfulness itself may constitute 
contributory negligence. Eisner v. Salt Lake 
City, 120 Utah 675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951). 
Dangerous objects. 
It is primary duty of city to exercise reason-
able care to maintain streets in reasonably safe 
condition, and to guard against injury to per-
sons and property by removing or making rea-
sonably safe any dangerous objects in streets. 
Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 
373 (1909). 
for driver's injuries caused as result of obstruc-
tion. Stevens v. Salt Lake Countv, 25 Utah 2d 
IfiS 47R P'>A dQR M Q 7 m 
Discretionary function. 
Power of public service commission under 
§ 54-4-14 to require public utility to construct 
and maintain appropriate safety devices at 
grade crossings is a discretionary function, and 
$ 63-30-10 excepts the commission from 
waiver of immunity for injuries caused by fail-
ure to require warnings at crossing. Velasquez 
v Union Pac. R.R., 24~Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 
• 1970). 
The design of a system of traffic-control 
semaphores did not involve "the basic policy 
making level" nor constitute a discretionary-
act for which § 63-30-10 would provide immu-
nity to the state in a tort action alleging 
dangerously designed, constructed and main-
tained electric traffic-control semaphore 
caused an auto accident resulting in personal 
injury. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980), 
Ice and snow on sidewalk. 
Cities and towns are not liable for failure to 
keep sidewalks free from natural accumula-
tions of ice and snow, but may be held liable for 
injuries arising from such snow and ice upon 
streets or sidewalks which are placed there by 
thrir own acts. IVtgrr v. Hull Lnkr Citv, f>(> 
Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 13 A.L.U. 5 (1920) 
(decided under former law). 
Manholes, 
A city was liable for damages sustained 
when right rear wheel of automobile crashed 
through a defective manhole lid where the city 
was negligent in failing to maintain street in a 
reasonably safe condition for vehicular traffic 
by allowing a broken and cracked manhole lid 
to remain in the street. Wilson v. Salt Lake 
City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371 P.2d 644 (1962). 
Negligent construction. 
Where university construction diverted flow 
of surface water, flooding basement and caus-
ing other damage to adjoining landowner, gov-
ernmental immunity was waived and univer-
sity was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 
(Utah 1971). 
There was adequate evidence to support, jury 
finding that highway project of the state, in-
cluding the storm drain system, was unneces-
sarily defective or dangerous and had resulted 
in damage to plaintiffs' property by diversion 
of rainwater from channels which had previ-
ously carried it to points beyond the plaintiffs' 
properties. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 
(Utah 1975). 
New duties not created. 
This section did not create any new duties 
but merely waived immunity, and since county 
had no duty to correct conditions on private 
property that obstructed motor bike driver's 
view of county road, it could not be held liable 
exercise due care in main taming its streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition A D D E N D U M 8 
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63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, struc-
ture, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
latent defective conditions. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Latent defective condition. 
Legislative intent. 
Negligent construction. 
Notice to city. 
Other public improvement. 
Latent defective condition. 
Defect in a county storm drain that was dis-
coverable by a reasonable inspection was not a 
latent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978). 
Legislative intent. 
Intent of legislature was to include within 
the waiver of immunity an action for private 
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on 
a dangerous or defective condition of a public 
improvement that unreasonably interferes 
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's 
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 
Utah 2d 285. 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
Negligent construction. 
Where university construction diverted flow 
of surface water, flooding basement and caus-
ing other damage to adjoining landowner, gov-
ernmental immunity was waived and univer-
sity was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni-
versity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 
(1971). 
Notice to city. 
Requirement that notice of claim be given to 
political subdivision within ninety days (now 
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this 
section. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law). 
Other public improvement. 
Damages to house and basement partially 
incurred from defective conditions of sewer 
drain and canal fell under purview of this sec-
tion. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1975). 
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63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(0 arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assis-
tance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacua-
tions. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amend-
ment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. If § 78-16-5 or Subsection 
77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities shall remain immune 
from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. The 1985 amendment, effective March 18, 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1. 1985, added Subsection (1)(1) and made minor 
Amendment Notes. — The 1982 amend- changes in phraseology, 
ment designated the former section as Subsec- Cross-References. — Indemnification of 
tion(l); substituted letters for numbers as sub- public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 
division designations; and added Subsection 53 3Q 33 
(2). 
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and placed her in foster care. Little v. Utah 
State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1983). 
Incarceration in state prison. 
The exception of the waiver of governmental 
immunity for injuries arising out of the incar-
ceration of a person in the state prison does not 
constitute a denial of equal protection nor is it 
against public policv. Madsen v. State, 583 
P2d 92 (Utah 1978). 
This section barred a wrongful death action 
against the state and board of corrections for 
death of a prisoner due to alleged negligent 
treatment of the prisoner after surgery in the 
prison hospital. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1978). 
State is immune under Subsection (10) (now 
(l)(j)) of this section from claim of inmate for 
negligent deprivation of property, but individ-
ual employees of the state are not immune. 
Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
Individual agents' immunity. 
Under subsection (10) (now (l)(j)) of this sec-
tion, individual defendants are not immune 
from liability for their own torts. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
Psychologist working with university medi-
cal center on contractual basis and alleged to 
have been negligent in his treatment of sui-
cidal patient was acting in a ministerial rather 
than discretionary capacity and thus was not 
immune from suit. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 
517 (Utah 1980). 
Legislative intent. 
Since the waiver of immunity in § 63-30-8 
and § 63-30-9 encompasses a much broader 
field of tort liability than merely negligent con-
duct of employees within the scope of their em-
ployment, the Legislature could not have in-
tended that this section, with its exceptions, 
should modify the preceding two sections even 
though it be conceded that the negligent con-
duct of an employee might be involved in an 
action for injuries caused by the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous or defective condi-
tion. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 
285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
Misrepresentation in advertisement. 
City is immune to tort action for deceit and 
misrepresentation in its advertisement for con-
struction bids which failed to disclose to bid-
ders that a competitive advantage had been 
granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake 
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). 
Sale of recovered stolen property. 
Where plaintiffs motorcycle was stolen, re-
covered, held for trial of alleged thief, then sold 
by State Tax Commission without notice to 
plaintiff (who never received notice letter), the 
motorcycle's sale did not involve such exercise 
Utah Law Reviews. — Misapplication of 
Governmental Immunitv — Epting v. Utah 
1976 Utah L. Rev. 186." 
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for build-
ing inspector's negligent performance of duties, 
41 A.L.R.3d 567. 
 of "basic policy evaluation" as to make it a dis-
 cretionary decision under Subsection (1) (now 
(lNaO of this section, but rather the decision to 
sell was an operation function and not immune 
• from attack; also, since defendant tax commis-
\ sion never claimed taxes were owing on the 
motorcycle and no taxes were deducted from 
the sale price, and since the motorcycle was 
„ being held as evidence in a criminal prosecu-
tion, the commission could not claim immunity 
on basis of the tax exception under Subsection 
(8) (now (l)(h)) of this section. Morrison v. Salt 
[ Lake City Corp.. 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979). 
e State hospital patient. 
2 State was immune from liability for wrong-
ful death of patient who voluntarily entered 
v
 state hospital since she was "incarcerated" or 
r "confined" within the meaning of this section; 
1- "other place of legal confinement" includes the 
•• hospital. The fact that decedent was voluntary 
>• patient did not preclude conclusion that she 
was "incarcerated" since she had not sought 
release and had she done so, superintendent 
e could obtain court order preventing her re-
lease. Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1. 483 P.2d 
' 1296 (1971). 
" State prison inmate. * * 
0
 Complaint of inmate of state prison for dam-
" ages from injuries inflicted by fellow prisoner 
 was properly dismissed as to state which is 
lfc
 governmental entity within meaning of statute 
d defining "governmental entity" and because 
statute waiving sovereign immunity from neg-
ligent acts of all governmental entities specifi-
3 cally excepts injuries arising out of the incar-
r ceration of any person in any state prison from 
{. the operation of the statute; although warden 
,. of state prison is not "governmental entity" 
t. within statute and consequently was not im-
5> mune from suit for alleged negligence, com-
plaint against him was properly dismissed un-
i. der common-law rule that where one inmate 
n has injured another, warden and other prison 
r officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign 
j . immunity against claims of negligence so long 
as thev are acting in good faith. Sheffield v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968). 
Trees negligently cut. 
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for 
i  damage sustained by abutting homeowner 
1- when trees were blown down as result of un-
necessarv and negligent cutting of roots. Mor-
ris v. Salt Lake Citv, 35 Utah 474. 101 P. 373 
(1909). 
University medical center. 
»- State's immunity from suit was waived un-
der this section in action alleging negligent 
treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist 
and psychologist at university medical center, 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Validity and construction of statute autho-
rizing or requiring governmental unit to in-
demnify public officer or employee for liability 
arising out of performance of public duties, 71 
A.L.R.3d 90. 
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68-3-11. Rules < : >f < construction,, as U > words and phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are 
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appro-
priate meaning or definition. 
History: R.S. 1,898 & C.L. ISO?,, § 2437; 
C.L. 1917, § 3847; R.S 1933 & C 1943,, 
88-2-11. 
Cross-References. — Duty of court to con-
strue statutes, § 78-21-3. 
NOTES r o DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application, 
Court's duty. 
Meaning of word "maintain/ ' 
Meaning of word "may." 
Supplying omissions. 
Title of act. 
Words used repeatedly in statute. 
Construct ion and applicat ion. 
Where there is doubt respecting true mean-
ing of certain words, then words should be read 
in light of conditions and necessities which 
they are intended to meet and objects sought to 
be attained thereby. United States Smelting, 
Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P 902 (1921). 
Presumption is that words are used in their 
ordinary sense and if a different interpretation 
is sought it must rest upon something in the 
character of the legislation or in the context 
which will justify a different meaning. Deseret 
Sav. Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 35, 217 P. 1114 
(1923). 
Unless technical terms are used, words em-
ployed in statute must be given their usual and 
ordinary meaning. Cache Auto Co. v. Central 
Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 P. 862, 30 A.L.R. 1217 
(1923). 
Meaning of words found in statute must be 
determined from general context of the same 
and the intent or object sought to be accom-
plished by the legislation, and courts in at-
tempting to arrive at the intent of the Legisla-
ture will disregard mere forms and look to the 
substance. State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226 
P. 674 (1924). 
Words and phrases are to be construed ac-
cording to the context and the approved usage 
of the language; except in case of technical 
words and phrases, they must be construed ac-
cording to their plain and ordinary meaning, 
but technical rules of construction may be dis-
regarded where it is manifest, when the subject 
of legislation, considered from all points of 
view, is such as to convince the understanding 
that the Legislature could not have intended a 
literal interpretation. State v. Hendrickson, 67 
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 (1926). 
This section is merely declaratory of pre-ex-
isting rules of statutory construction. State v. 
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933). 
Definition of word may depend upon the 
character of its use in a statute. State v. 
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933). 
Unless contrary appears, terms of legislative 
enactment must be taken in their ordinary and 
usual significance as they are generally under-
stood., Emmertson v, State Tax Comm'n, 93 
Utah 219. 72 P.2d 467, 113 A.L.R. 1174 (1937). 
Court 's duty. 
It is duty of courts to enforce plain, intent of 
statute, but courts ought not to construe an act 
to effect the forfeiture of property of one citizen 
to another, unless "plain and unequivocal 
mandate of the Legislature admits of no other 
rational construction/' Rospigliosi v. Glenallen 
Mining Co., 69 Utah 41, 252 P. 276 (1926) (con-
struing usury statute). 
In construction of statutes it is duty of courts 
to ascertain intent of legislative body, and in 
determining this intent, not only should lan-
guage of act be considered, but also purposes 
and objects sought by Legislature, and if legis-
lation is within constitutional power, to en-
force such intent. Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156, 
258 P. 1016 (1927). 
It is court's duty, when possible, to give to 
every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of 
statute a consistent, reasonable meaning. Rob-
inson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(19271 
Meaning of word "maintain." 
In applying this section to the construction of 
word 'maintain," the court said that that 
which is contained in statute by implication is 
as much part of statute as that which expressly 
appears therein. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah 
273, 46 P. 1096 (1896). 
Meaning of word "may." 
Word ''may" as used in § 78-56-10, providing 
that judge of city court "may" employ short-
hand reporter upon request of any party, 
should be construed as discretionary, not man-
datory. Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah 467,195 P. 
547 (1921). 
Supplying omissions. 
In construing statutes court may supply 
manifest omissions in order to avoid absurd 
and mischievous consequences and to effect 
legislative intent. Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Pub-
lic Utils. Comm'n, 69 Utah 521, 256 P. 790 
(1927). 
Court may inquire into purpose sought to be 
accomplished in order to supply missing words 
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of statute, and words which are obviously nec-
essary to complete sense will be supplied to 
effect a meaning clearly shown by other parts 
of statute. Chez ex rel. Weber College v. Utah 
State Bldg. Comm'n, 93 Utah 538, 74 P.2d 687 
(1937). 
Title of act. 
While it is true that the title is not inte-
grated into the operating portion of legislation, 
and that it will not be permitted to contradict 
or defeat a plainly expressed intent, and that 
such title cannot be used to create an ambigu-
ity or uncertainty when the language in the 
body of the "act is clear, nevertheless, where 
clarity is lacking in the language of an enact-
ment, the title may be considered to shed light 
upon and clarify the meaning. Great Salt Lake 
Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 
414 P.2d 963 (1966). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes 
§§ 204, 225 to 227, 238, 250. 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 314, 315, 329, 
330, 348. 
Words used repeatedly in statute. 
Word repeatedly used in statute will be pre-
sumed to bear same meaning throughout stat-
ute, unless there is something to show that an-
other meaning was intended. Merrill v. Spen-
cer, 14 Utah 273, 46 P. 1096 (1896); State v. 
Tingey, 24 Utah 225, 67 P. 33 (1902). 
The same words, especially if found in differ-
ent statutes, may not always have the same 
effect, and it follows that in order to determine 
intention and purpose of lawmaker, and to har-
monize conflicting provisions where such oc-
cur, it at times becomes necessary for courts to 
expand or to restrict ordinary and usual mean-
ing of words, phrases, or clauses found in par-
ticular section or statute. Board of Educ. of 
Carbon County School Dist. v. Bryner, 57 Utah 
78, 192 P. 627 (1920). 
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=> 178, 179, 188, 
192, 208. 
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78-2-2. S u p r e m e <'ourl luriHiiHinn | l«]fTf»<HM1" inilil Ijni'i-
,it> L i!l8H|, 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States, 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mm. u n;p 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a.) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts: 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(gj those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
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JIuli" iiVI'i, „! nummary j u d g m e n t 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a, claim., counterclaim., or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summai y judgment in his favor upon, all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
fd) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
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GARY L. GREGERSON (#1254) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Provo City Corporation 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 34503 
Teleohone: (801) 379-6140 
:HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
e t a l . , 
P l a i n t i f f s and 
A p p e l l a n t s , 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM HOWARD NEFF 
Docket Number 880083 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF UTAH. 
ss. 
) 
WILLIAM HOWARD NEFF being first duly sworn deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. My name is William Howard Neff. 
2. I am a golf course architect and have been a member 
of the American Society of Golf Course Architects since 1971. 
I obtained a degree in architecture from the University of Utah 
in 1958. Since 1981 I have been self-employed and involved in 
various and numerous golf course projects. 
3. In 1984 I obtained a contract to build a golf course 
for Provo City, which I did by putting together a group called 
the "Neff Alliance." 
4. During the course of the golf course construction, I 
interacted and dealt with Utah Department of Transportation 
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personnel as they had an 1-15 construction project adjacent to 
and bordering on the golf course construction project. 
5, During the course of that project, I was told by Utah 
Department of Transportation personnel that the dikes or berms 
built along the 1-15 freeway were to serve a dual purpose as 
they wanted to come in later and raise the freeway. 
DATED this \p dav of May, 1933. 
t 
w 
Am^^WwTfli,' 
I L L M l HQW?tf>D.NEFF 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn to be fo r e me t h i s I A day of May, 
1988. 
4?£^ 
My Commission Expires 
7-30-?. 
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GARY L. GREGERSON (#1254) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Provo City Corporation 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 379-6140 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
et al. , 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF EARL S. KEMP 
Docket Number 880083 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF UTAH. 
ss. 
) 
EARL S. KEMP being first duly sworn deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. My name is Earl S. Kemp. 
2. I am a licensed professional engineer, licensed in 
the states of Utah, Idaho and Wyoming. I have been employed as 
a professional engineer for approximately eleven years. I 
obtained a Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering from 
the Brigham Young University in 1973 and a Master's in Civil 
Engineering from Utah State University in 1979. 
3. I am currently employed by Forsgren-Perkins 
Engineering and have been employed by them for approximately 
ten years. 
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4. Forsgren-Perkins contracted with Neff Alliance for 
consulting engineering work to build a golf course for and in 
Provo City. I was assigned as the consulting engineer and in 
that capacity was on the site of the golf course construction 
and on the site of the Utah Department of Transportation 
project along 1-15 between the Ironton-Springville off-ramp and 
the University off-ramp, a part of which is adjacent to the 
golf course construction. In that capacity, I interacted and 
dealt with Utah Department of Transportation personnel on the 
diking project and observed conditions and construction 
firsthand. 
5. I was advised by people from UDOT that they could 
obtain no federal money for diking but they could get federal 
money for elevating the roadway. Because of this, it is my 
understanding from what I was told, that UDOT built the dike 
along 1-15 for material to do a later elevation of the roadway. 
6. An elevation of the freeway road bed could serve 
several purposes. It could be used in an effort to put the 
freeway at a height so it would not be subject to a rise in the 
level of Utah Lake or flooding. It could also be used to 
improve the freeway as an increased base makes a better roadway. 
DATED this ^° day of April, 1988. 
EARL S. KEMP 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J?>c) -^ day of 
April, 1988. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellant Provo City to the following on the / - ' day 
of June, 1988. 
Bruce L. Richards 
Bruce L. Richards & Associates 
Attorneys for Christensen & 
Griffith Construction 
P.O. Box 26786 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84126-0786 
Robert H. Henderson 
Snow, Chirstensen & Martineau 
Attorneys for Staker Paving 
& Construction Company 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Carmen E. Kipp 
Robert H. Rees 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
and DOT 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Gallegos Construction Company 
P.O. Box 14547 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547 
Kevin McBride 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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